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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DUE DILIGENCE AND
RULE 415: ANOTHER DILEMMA
LAWRENCE F. ORBE III
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal securities laws' were enacted to provide, among
other things, full and fair disclosure to the public concerning issu-
ers and their securities. The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the federal courts have focused with confusion upon the
duties and responsibilities of attorneys who play a central role in
this disclosure process.2 In the wake of major securities scandals,3
the SEC attempted to promulgate its own standards of profes-
sional responsibility for attorneys, generally conceded to be more
complex, more stringent and steeped in the "public interest. ' '4
These suggested levels of professional responsibility created con-
flicts with the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) 5 and elic-
ited strong favorable and unfavorable responses." At the peak of
this concern for the public interest, securities attorneys, issuers,
and underwriters were in a dilemma with respect to the attorney-
client relationship, the duty to disclose, a public mandate to "blow
1. The federal securities laws are generally considered to include the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78kk (1976); the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1976);
the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -52 (1976); and the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1976).
2. One commentator has noted:
[T]he professional judgment of the attorney is often the "passkey" to securities
transactions. If he gives an opinion that an exemption is available, securities get
sold; if he doesn't give the opinion, they don't get sold. If he judges that certain
information must be included in a registration statement, it gets included. . .; if
he concludes it need not be included, it doesn't get included.
Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,631, at 83,689 (January, 1974).
3. Names such as BarChris, National Student Marketing, Penn Central, Equity Fund-
ing, IOS, Stirling Homex, Four Seasons, and Westec became well known far beyond Wall
Street. See Cheek, Professional Responsibility and Self-Regulation of the Securities Law-
yer, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 597, 600 (1975).
4. For an excellent analysis of the development of this trend, written at the time that it
was occurring, see Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An
Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 412 (1974).
5. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979).
6. Perhaps the strongest position in favor of expanded responsibilities was taken by
Commissioner Sommer. See supra note 2. Interestingly, Roberta S. Karmel represented a
strong spokesperson for the other point of view before she became an SEC commissioner.
See Daley & Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 24
EMORY L.J. 747 (1975).
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the whistle," and the appropriateness of withdrawal by the
attorney.7
The SEC itself, in February, 1981, admitted that clearly enunci-
ated standards of professional responsibility did not exist through-
out the 1970's:
The ethical and professional responsibilities of lawyers who be-
come aware that their client is engaging in violations of the secur-
ities laws have not been so firmly and unambiguously established
that we believe all practicing lawyers can be held to an awareness
of generally recognized norms. We also recognize that the Com-
mission has never articulated or endorsed any such standards.8
In addition, the question of whether the attorney was required to
report improper client conduct to the SEC was not squarely ad-
dressed in actual litigation.9
RULE 2(E)
As part of its rules of practice, the SEC promulgated Rule 2(e),
which in its most recent amended form provides:
7. As Sommer observed:
It means [the attorney] will have to be acutely cognizant of his responsibility to
the public who engage in securities transactions that would never have come about
were it not for his professional presence. It means he will have to adopt the
healthy skepticism toward the representations of management which a good audi-
tor must adopt. It means he will have to do the same thing the auditor does when
confronted with an intransigent client-resign.
Sommer, supra note 2, at 83,689-90.
An attorney formerly with the Division of Enforcement of the SEC went further:
In serving a corporate-client, a lawyer must be acutely cognizant of the client's
responsibilities to its shareholders....
• . .The obligations which corporations have to their shareholders must, to
some degree, be shouldered by the lawyer-adviser who counsels the corporations.
There may even be circumstances so serious that the lawyer may have to take
some action on his own so as not to frustrate the ends sought to be achieved by
the law.
Gruenbaum, Corporate/Securities Lawyers: Disclosure, Responsibility, Liability to Inves-
tors and National Student Marketing Corp., 54 NoTR DAMia LAw. 795, 827-28 (1979).
8. In re Carter [1981 Transfer Binder] FeD. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,170
(S.E.C. Feb. 28, 1981) (footnote omitted).
9. See SEC v. National Student Mktg Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978); Escott v.
BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Even Meyerhofer, where an at-
torney submitted an affidavit to the SEC upon discovering inadequate disclosure, did not
consider whether the lawyer has any duty to disclose any information to the SEC without
his client's consent. Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974).
RULE 415
The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the priv-
ilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person
who is found by the Commission after notice of and opportunity
for hearing in the matter (i) not to possess the requisite qualifica-
tions to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or in-
tegrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional
conduct, or (iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and
abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities
laws, . . . or the rules and regulations thereunder. 10
Rule 2(e) may be applied when an attorney is disciplined by local
authorities or convicted of a crime.11 The rule may also be applied
where the attorney has been enjoined by a federal court or found
to have violated or aided and abetted a violation of securities
laws.1 2 Finally, the rule may be applied when the SEC initiates an
administrative proceeding before an administrative law judge.'In
some forty-six years of the SEC's history, only a little more than
one hundred Rule 2(e) proceedings have been initiated by the SEC
against attorneys, most of which have not been litigated." The
SEC has never brought a disciplinary proceeding against an attor-
ney based solely on a failure to meet ethical or professional stan-
dards. 15 Generally, Rule 2(e) proceedings, other than willful viola-
tions; have been based on aiding and abetting violations. 6 It could
be maintained that this has been so because it is difficult to draw a
line between improper conduct and aiding and abetting.17 How-
ever, it is equally maintainable that aiding and abetting allega-
tions, if proven, could provide stronger sanctions, more readily rec-
ognized and understood by the investing public, than sanctions
imposed for improper conduct."8 The SEC's position, in part, re-
10. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1981).
11. Greene, Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings Before the Securities and Exchange Com-





15. Id. at 84,802.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. "For example, even if a lawyer is justified in not disclosing his client's violation of
the securities laws under the Code, he may nonetheless find himself named as a defendant
in an SEC civil enforcement action as an aider and abettor of the violation." Lipman, The
SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 437, 460 (1974).
Sanctions for improper conduct as defined by the Code generally involve censure, suspen-
sion, and, infrequently, disbarment. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, Preamble and Prelimi-
1983]
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flects the assumption that increasing the liabilities of securities
lawyers will result in greater protection of the investing public.1"
In 1976 the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder held
that scienter is required as proof of aiding and abetting violations
of securities laws.2" However, the holding in Hochfelder was ap-
plied to private damage actions and the SEC took the position that
this action was inapplicable to administrative proceedings.21 In
Aaron v. SEC,22 the Supreme Court extended the Hochielder test
to include other civil actions, but held that scienter is not required
in civil enforcement actions under Section 17(a)(2) or Section
17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933.23 Nonetheless, reckless con-
duct has been held to be proof of scienter.24 In addition, violations
can be proved by a preponderance of the evidence standard as op-
posed to a clear and convincing test.2 5 This reduced evidentiary
standard of proof facilitates disciplinary proceedings whether or
not 2(e) proceedings will ultimately be confirmed as in fact circum-
venting scienter requirements.2 6 Negligence has been used as a test
nary Statement. Aiding and abetting sanctions include injunctions, prohibitions, disqualifi-
cations, remedial conduct decrees and severe practice penalties secured through settlements.
See Downing & Miller, The Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e), 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 774
(1979). Disqualification from practice before the SEC can lead to loss of livelihood in other
professional endeavors. An SEC injunction can increase a person's exposure to civil liabili-
ties in private damage actions. Lowenfels, Sqienter or Negligence Required For SEC In-
junctions Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: A Fascinating Paradox, 33 Bus. LAW, 789,
806-07 (1978).
19. Lipman, supra note 18, at 465.
20. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). '[Scienter' refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate or defraud." Id. at 193 n.12.
21. Downing & Miller, supra note 18, at 783 (citing In re Haskins & Sells, Accounting
Series Release No. 73 (1952), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,088). Downing & Miller also
discuss the SEC's maneuvers in this regard at 783-84.
22. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
23. Section 17(a)(1) clearly requires scienter. That section makes it illegal "to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud." Section 17(a)(2) prohibits a person from ob-
taining money or property "by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact." Section 17(a)(3) prohibits a person from engaging "in any
transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit." This language focuses on results, not culpability. Id. at 696-97. The Court was citing
Securities Act of 1933, § 17 (a)(1)-(3). 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1)-(3)(c)(1976) (emphasis omitted).
24. In re Gibson [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,068 at 84,710,
84,713 (S.E.C. Dec. 7, 1981); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3rd Cir. 1979). McLean
adopted the Sundstrand definition of recklessness. "[It] presents a danger of misleading
... that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been
aware of it." Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) (citing Franke v. Midwestern Oklahoma Dev. Auth., 428 F.
Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).
25. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91,102 (1981).
26. See generally Gruenbaum, supra note 7, at 820-21; Robins, Policeman, Conscience
RULE 415
in place of reckless conduct even in non-2(e) proceedings.2" There-
fore, the reckless, and in some cases negligent, standard could
roughly equate to the standard of proof required in an allegation of
improper conduct.28 Paradoxically, less egregious conduct can re-
sult in stricter sanctions. The SEC's Rule 2(e) proceedings have, in
effect, been its disciplinary weapon against improper conduct.
THE CODE
In order to put Rule 2(e) within the framework of the Code, an
analysis of applicable Code provisions is in order. The Code con-
tains nine canons, each of which is accompanied by a number of
ethical considerations (EC) and disciplinary rules (DR). Ethical
considerations represent goals or objectives and are aspirational in
character. The disciplinary rules are enunciated as mandatory
levels of minimal conduct.2 9 The American Bar Association (ABA)
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility supplements
these with formal Opinions in problem areas.30 Historically, these
opinions and principles have focused on the courtroom lawyer and
have paid little homage to the attorney as adviser, his principal
function in securities matters.3 " Canon 5 provides that "a lawyer
should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a
client."3 2 This canon requires uncompromising loyalty to the cli-
ent,3 and suggests sole allegience to the corporate client. 4 It was
not until recently that the SEC acknowledged this important as-
pect of the canons.35
or Confidant: Thoughts on the Appropriate Response of a Securities Attorney Who Sus-
pects Client Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, 15 J. MAR. L. REv. 373, 389-91
(1982).
27. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). In Spectrum, the court held that
the lawyer's ignorance was the result of his own negligence, and reasoned that the lawyer's
role was sufficiently important to hold him to a duty of reasonable care. Id. at 542. BarChris
laid the groundwork for the court's approach in Spectrum. Robbins, supra note 28, at 389
n.62. See also SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968) (lawyer not mere scrivener for
client, bearing no responsibility for accuracy of statements).
28. See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 811 (2d Cir. 1975).
29. Cheek, supra note 3, at 621.
30. Id.
31. See Gruenbaum, supra note 7, at 800. See also Cheek, supra note 3, at 620-21.
32. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at Canon 5.
33. Id. at EC 5-1.
34. Id. at EC 5-18.
35. "We are mindful that, when a lawyer represents a corporate client, the client-and
the entity to which he owes his allegiance-is the corporation itself and not management or
any other individual connected with the corporation." In re Carter [1981 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,171 (S.E.C. Feb. 28, 1981) (footnote omitted).
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Canon 7 provides that "a lawyer should represent a client zeal-
ously within the bounds of the law."'3' This canon points out that
as adviser, the attorney, in appropriate circumstances, should give
his professional opinion as to future consequences of proposed ac-
tivities.3 7 The attorney should inform his client of the practical ef-
fects of the client's conduct and may continue the representation
of the client, even though future conduct is contrary to his advice,
so long as it does not involve illegal conduct.38 Also, Canon 7 sug-
gests that the decision to forego legally available alternatives is ul-
timately the client's decision and the lawyer should exert his best
efforts to insure his client's decisions are made only after being
fully informed of relevant considerations. 9 While providing an in-
teresting philosophical backdrop, these aspirational statements
provide insufficient guidance for the practicing attorney.
One disciplinary rule provides that a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta-
tion." 0 This can be related to willful violations of securities laws.
Knowingly engaging in fraudulent misrepresentation would meet
the Hochfelder test and certainly 2(e) requirements as well. 41 An-
other disciplinary rule provides instructions with regard to with-
drawal from employment. 42 Resignation does not operate to correct
continuing violations and the SEC has acknowledged that such ac-
tion is frequently inappropriate.43 Other rules give contradictory
instructions with respect to the preservation of confidences and
secrets of clients" and highlight the conflict with "whistle-blowing
36. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at Canon 7.
37. Id. at EC 7-3.
38. Id. at EC 7-5.
39. Id. at EC 7-8.
40. Id. at DR 1-102(A)(4).
41. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n. 12. Active participation in fraud subjects the attorney
to liability under federal securities laws. See Patterson, The Limits of the Lawyer's Discre-
tion and the Law of Legal Ethics: National Student Marketing Revisited, 1979 DuKE L.J.
1251, 1256-57.
42. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at 2-110.
43. In Carter the court stated:
Premature resignation serves neither the end of an effective lawyer-client relation-
ship nor, in most cases, the effective administration of the securities laws. The
lawyer's continued interaction with his client will ordinarily hold the greatest
promise of corrective action. .. . In general, the best result is that which pro-
motes the continued, strong-minded and independent participation by the lawyer.
In re Carter, supra note 8, at 84,172-73. (Evans, C., concurring and dissenting).
44. "A lawyer may reveal:. ..(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under [DR's] or
required by law or court order. (3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime." MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at DR 4-101(c)(2)
RULE 415
standards" urged by the SEC." Lawyers have been in a quandry
when attempting to reconcile this rule with the SEC's position on
the matter."'
One rule admonishes the attorney to accept employment only
when competent to do so.' 7 This is consistent with the SEC's Rule
2(e)(1), which provides that disciplinary action attaches when com-
petence is lacking.'8 Rules within Canon 7 provide direct instruc-
tions to the attorney with respect to actions which may bear on
scienter." Another rule admonishes the attorney not to accept em-
ployment if it would be likely to involve him in representing differ-
ing interests.6 0 However, this rule is too general to provide the at-
torney with any clear direction in the course of his securities work.
In summary then, the fraud 51 and scienter52 rules appear to em-
body prohibitions sufficiently fundamental in nature that their
coverage plainly falls within the area of conduct prohibited by
Rule 2(e).11 In this respect Rule 2(e) can be considered consistent
with and embodied in the Code. This embodiment should be taken
into consideration in the context of EC 5-18 (allegiance to corpo-
and (3) (footnotes omitted). Contrary directions are found in DR 7-102:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (1) His client has, in
the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal
shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or
is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal,
except when the information is protected as a privileged communication. (2) A
person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal shall
promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal.
MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at DR 7-102(B) (footnotes omitted).
45. See Sommer, supra note 2; Gruenbaum, supra note 7, at 827-28.
46. The ABA defined "privileged communications" and "fraud" in such a broad fashion
that the SEC would term the approach causistic. See ABA Comm. On Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341, (1975). With respect to attorney-client relationships,
the ABA further stated: "We do not believe that the policy of disclosure as embodied in the
SEC laws warrants an exception to the basic confidentiality of the attorney-client relation-
ship. Such exceptions have to date been carefully reserved by the [Code] for far more criti-
cal and limited situations." Statement of Policy Adopted by American Bar Association Re-
garding Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the
Compliance by Clients with Laws Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, 31 Bus.LAW, 543, 547 (1975).
47. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at DR 6-101 (A).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1981).
49. "In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:... (4) Knowingly use perjured
testimony or false evidence. (5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact .... (7)
Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent."
MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at DR 7-102(A).
50. Id. at DR 5-105(a).
51. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at DR 1-102(A)(4).
52. Id. at DR 7-102(A).
53. In re Carter, supra note 8, at 84,170 n.65.
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rate client) and EC 7-8 (informed decisions). This recent SEC po-
sition is more circumspect than that enunciated in the 1970's and
harmonious with the ABA's stated position on the matter.5 4
THE MODEL RULES
The ABA's Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
is preparing a revised and more practice-oriented code of responsi-
bility.5 5 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Final Draft)
specifically addresses the duties of advisers to corporations.5 6 One
proposed rule seeks to clarify the identity of the client, indicates
that the attorney's duty is to the organization and highlights the
factors that a lawyer should consider in selecting a course of ac-
tion. 7 Significantly, the proposed rule outlines steps that may be
taken to minimize the disruption of the organization and to pre-
vent the risk of revealing confidential information when an attor-
ney knows a violation of securities laws has occurred or will occur.
They are:
(1) asking for reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be
sought for presentation to appropriate authority in the organiza-
tion; and
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organiza-
tion, including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, re-
ferral to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organi-
zation as determined by applicable law.58
If a lawyer is aware of a violation of a securities law, but believes
that the violation will go undetected unless he discloses it, the cor-
rect response may be for him not to disclose it.59 Clear justification
must exist for going over the head of the person responsible for
such activities.6"
In the Final Draft, a proposed rule eliminates ambiguities in the
Code with respect to "crimes" and "fraud" in past and future ac-
tivities." Another rule of the Final Draft is also helpful:
54. Opinion 341, supra note 46.
55. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft, May 30, 1981).
56. Id. at Rule 1.13. See Robins, supra note 26, at 399.
57. MODEL RULES, supra note 55, at Rule 1.13; Robins, supra note 26, at 399.
58. MODEL RULES, supra note 55, at Rule 1.13.
59. Id.; Robins, supra note 26, at 400.
60. MODEL RULES, supra note 55, at Rule 1.13 comment.
61. Id. at Rule 1.6 and comment.
RULE 415
A lawyer shall not counsel or assist a client in conduct that the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know is criminal or fraudu-
lent, or in the preparation of an instrument containing terms the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know are legally prohibited,
but a lawyer may counsel or assist a client in a good faith effort to
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.""
The commentary indicates that the lawyer should withdraw if his
continued involvement assists the client's unlawful activity.63 An-
other part of the Final Draft explains this rule further and sug-
gests that the rule is activated when a client's activity renders the
lawyer's prior statements untrue. 4
The Final Draft provides more direction for the securities practi-
tioner and appears to be more closely allied with the SEC's imple-
mentation of 2(e).6 5 Under the Final Draft, a securities lawyer
must attempt to stop the violation he uncovers, refrain from activ-
ity that would contribute to the violation, seek assistance from
higher authority, resign if met with continual refusal to cease un-
lawful activities and disclose the wrongdoing if the activity contin-
ues with the client making use of the attorney's prior
involvement. 6
The SEC recently formulated its own standards for determining
unethical or improper professional conduct:
When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation
of a company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of
the federal securities laws becomes aware that his client is en-
gaged in a substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those dis-
closure requirements, his continued participation violates profes-
sional standards unless he takes prompt steps to end the client's
noncompliance.6 '
The Commission held that this was a prospective ruling,68 princi-
pally because standards had not previously been promulgated. 9
62. Id. at Rule 1.2(d).
63. Id. at Rule 1.2 comment.
64. Id. at Rule 4.1(b)(2). It provides: "In the course of representing a client a lawyer
shall not:... (b) knowingly fail to disclose a fact to a third person when:... (2) disclosure is
necessary to prevent assisting a criminal or fraudulent act, as required by Rule 1.2(d)." Id.
65. See National Student Mktg., 457 F. Supp. 682.
66. Robins, supra note 26, at 406.
67. In re Carter, supra note 8, at 84,172.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 84,170. See also supra text accompanying note 8. Perhaps the first time that
1983]
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Rule 2(e) is a powerful SEC weapon which can result in strict
sanctions. While it is true that no attorney has ever been held lia-
ble under traditional malpractice concepts to a group as large and
remote as the investing public,7 0 the SEC can use Rule 2(e) to im-
pose sanctions for any improper conduct which adversely affects
the investing public. Therefore, even if traditional tort concepts7
1
and lack of privity 2 do not result in large financial malpractice
damages for the attorney, the severity of the economic impact on
his practice through Rule 2(e) sanctions is a deterrent to cursory
practice."
RULE 415
Just as clearer direction with respect to professional respon-
sibilty in securities practice has begun to crystallize, another di-
lemma has been created. The SEC has recently instituted an ex-
perimental rule originally proposed as Rule 462(A)74 and adopted
as Rule 415 (Shelf Registration)," the effects of which will create a
new dilemma with respect to the attorney's professional responsi-
bilities.7 6 The issues in this rule concerning market volatility, pric-
ing, institutional market participation and industry trading prac-
tices are beyond the scope of this article." Here we are concerned
with the techniques of performing due diligence78 pursuant to Sec-
tion 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, " how this due diligence will
this new standard was applied was In re Gibson where a nine-month suspension was agreed
to in a settlement offer. What was enunciated as a code of professional responsibility stan-
dard produced an aiding and abetting violation-type of settlement. In re Gibson [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,068 (S.E.C. Dec. 7, 1981).
70. Cheek, supra note 3, at 604.
71. Id. at 603-04.
72. Id. at 602.
73. Id. at 634. See also Downing & Miller, supra note 20, at 789.
74. Securities Act Release No. 6276 (Dec. 23, 1980), 46 Fed. Reg. 78-80 (1981).
75. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.415).
76. Securities Act Release No. 6391 (Mar. 12, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 11,701 (1982), contains
a list of issues to be considered during the rule's experimental life. Important among these
are the due diligence problems facing the securities attorney.
77. See id.
78. "Due diligence" generally refers to the analytical and investigatory processes con-
ducted by counsel and underwriters prior to reaching a decision to purchase an issuer's
securities for distribution or placement. In securities law, a lack of due diligence is negli-
gence. SEC v. Geotek, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder], FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T95,756, at
90,723-24 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 1976).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976). An issuer's directors or partners, the underwriters, the ac-
countants and certain other persons are civilly liable for any untrue statement or omission
of a material fact contained in a registration statement, or omissions required to avoid mak-
ing the statements misleading. Securities Act Release No. 6335 (Aug. 6, 1981), 46 Fed. Reg.
RULE 415
vary from practices currently utilized by issuers, underwriters, and
their counsel in connection with registration requirements and re-
lated documents, and its impact on problems of professional
responsibility.
BACKGROUND
Rule 415 was proposed by the SEC in December 1980.80 The rule
became effective in February 1982, on a temporary basis, until De-
cember 10, 1982.81 Hearings on the proposed impact of the new
rule were held on June 28, 1982.82 On September 1, 1982, the Com-
mission voted to extend the rule until December 31, 1983."8 The
rule was adopted as part of the SEC's integrated disclosure system
and was designed to allow corporations that meet certain criteria
to take advantage of the process to raise capital through both debt
and equity offerings.8 4 The rule allows a company to register an
offering and market it over the ensuing two years, permitting sale
when market rates and conditions are deemed to be most
favorable.8 5
Historically, shelf registration has been the accepted procedure
in limited circumstances,8" but the reach of Rule 415 is without
precedent.87 Shelf registrations have been permitted on: securities
involved in continuing acquisition programs of other companies;s8
42,017 (1981).
80. 46 Fed. Reg. 78, supra note 74.
81. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,439 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(c)).
82. Wall St. J., June 30, 1982, at 2, col. 4.
83. Securities Act Release No. 6423 (Sept. 9, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 39,799 (1982).
84. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 supra note 75.
85. 46 Fed. Reg. 78, supra note 74.
The Rule codifies staff practice concerning shelf offerings which have occurred to
date, such as securities to be offered in a continuing acquisition program. Under
certain circumstances, it contemplates shelf registration for primary offerings of
equity securities which the registrant intends to sell on a non-fixed price basis
over time depending on market conditions. Also, the Rule contemplates an issuer's
selling the securities registered on the shelf in a succession of different kinds of
offerings. . . . Rule 415. . . permits registration of any security on a shelf regis-
tration statement in an amount that is reasonably expected to be offered and sold
within two years of the registration statement's effective date.
47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 supra note 75, at 11,394-95, (footnote omitted).
86. See 17 C.F.R. § 231.4936 (1976). Guide 4 of the SEC's Guides for Preparation and
Filing of Registration Statements Under the Securities Act of 1933 interpreted the rules as
to permissive shelf registrations. Guide 4 has been replaced by Rule 415. 47 Fed. Reg.
11,380, supra note 75, at 11,394 n.75.
87. Pitt & Williams, Should SEC's 'Shelf Rule' Be Shelved? Nat'l L.J., May 17, 1982, at
21, col. 2.
88. Guide 4, supra note 86.
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securities pledged by persons controlling the issuer, to facilitate
sale in the event of default;89 securities underlying options, rights
or convertible securities, if presently exercisible;90 and securities
received as underwriting compensation, or to recipients deemed
underwriters, including securities underlying options, rights or con-
vertible securities.91 In addition, the SEC has permitted shelf re-
gistration of continuous offerings of securities pursuant to em-
ployee benefit plans and dividend or interest reinvestment plans."
Under the new rule, permitted registrations include securities
expected to be sold within two years from the effective date of the
registration statement for the benefit of the registrant" and secon-
dary offerings," as well as those listed above.9 5
The SEC's stated objectives in promulgating the new rule in-
clude the assurance of a bona fide intention to offer and sell, to
provide current and accurate information about the security, and
to afford investors full liability protection under the Securities
Act.96 Rule 415 permits securities to be registered for an offering to
be made on a continuous or delayed basis subject to certain condi-
tions designed to achieve these objectives. 7
In order that "investors receive adequate current information," 98
a post-effective amendment is required.9 9 However, a sticker may
be used rather than a post-effective amendment to update infor-





92. 46 Fed. Reg. 78, supra note 74, at 87-88.
93. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,438 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (a)(1)(i)).
94. Id. at (a)(1)(ii).
95. Id. at (a)(1)(iii)-(vi). While continuous acquisition programs and underwriters as re-
cipients are not specifically referred to, these earlier classifications are covered under new
subsections (a)(1)(i) and (ii). 46 Fed. Reg. 78, supra note 74, at 88 n.74. Also, the new rule
covers certain securities of foreign issuers, such as American Depository Receipts. 47 Fed.
Reg. 11,438 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (a)(1)(vii)).
96. 46 Fed. Reg. 78, supra note 74, at 88.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 89.
99. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,427 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.512).
100. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,396 (1982). See also 47 Fed. Reg. 11,427 (1982) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 229.512). A sticker, containing supplemental or revised information may be at-
tached to the prospectus prior to circulation without submission to the SEC's post-effective
amendment filing and review process:
Material changes that can be stated accurately and succinctly in a short sticker
will ... be permitted .... If the registration statement names several underwrit-
ers who may participate in the shelf-registered offering, the selection of any one or
RULE 415
The issuer can thus name a group of potential managing under-
writers and choose from among them at the time of offering. 10 1 If
the distribution is contemplated by syndication, changes in the
members of the syndicate need only be indicated by sticker.102 The
issuer need not use an underwriter for at the market offerings of
debt securities.103
With respect to equity offerings, Rule 415 permits shelf registra-
tion at the market offerings, but a named underwriter is required
because the SEC "believes that the direct involvement of an un-
derwriter can provide a desirable discipline upon such offerings. "104
The SEC believes that the presence of an underwriter insures
timely and accurate disclosure to investors. 05 The underwriter
does not have to consent to be eliminated from the managing or
syndicate group.1 06
ROLE REVERSAL
In conventional underwriting practice, due diligence and prepa-
ration of registration materials would normally take weeks or
months, the "passkey"' 07 in the undertaking being counsel for ei-
ther the underwriter, placement agent, or dealer-manager. Market-
more of those underwriters to be the underwriter(s) with respect to a particular
portion of the shelf offering may be indicated by sticker supplement to the pro-
spectus. . . . [A] post-effective amendment need not be filed to disclose the addi-
tion or deletion of a managing underwriter as a co-manager unless there is no
longer at least one managing underwriter who was named in the registration state-
ment or the most recent post-effective amendment thereto.
47 Fed. Reg. 11,395-96 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
101. See Pitt & Williams, supra note 87. A managing underwriter generally organizes the
selling effort, maintains records of distribution, arranges overallotments and stabilization
activities and receives certain compensation generally not shared with the other underwrit-
ers. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,436 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.405) (definitions deleted, 47
Fed. Reg. 39,803 (1982)).
102. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,396 n.82 (1982). An underwriting syndicate, or purchase group, is a
number of underwriters who group together and agree to share the risks, liabilities and a
formal "agreement among underwriters" which specifies participation, compensation, timing
and certain indemnifications. See Greene, Determining the Responsibilities of Underwriters
Distributing Securities Within an Integrated Disclosure System, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 755,
762-63 (1981).
103. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,438 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (a)(3)). "At the
market offerings" refer to offerings of securities into an established trading market for those
securities at other than a fixed price. Id.
104. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, supra note 75, at 11,397.
105. Id.
106. Id. Under certain circumstances even an equity offering could be made without a
named underwriter. Id. at n.88.
107. Sommer, supra note 2, at 83,689.
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ing plans would be deferred until the completion of investigation,
analysis, tentative pricing and document drafting-the last of
these a comprehensive give-and-take marathon exchange between
corporate executives, corporate counsel, underwriters, under-
writer's counsel and, in certain matters, the issuer's auditors.10 8
This process provided an atmosphere conducive to frank and open
disclosure and permitted participants in the process to gain an in-
timate working knowledge of the issuer and its strengths and
weaknesses. It also gave the underwriter an opportunity to educate
its marketing force with respect to the proposed issue, in order
that they might properly inform prospective purchasers.
Under the new shelf registration rule, the controlling force be-
comes counsel for the corporate issuer. The issuer, through its
counsel, can prepare and file registration documents without the
participation of any underwriter or underwriter's counsel.10 9 The
reversal of this conventional process, combined with the possibility
of the entire offering being accelerated in an effort to meet a "win-
dow" in the market,"' creates the danger of a cursory due dili-
gence process to the possible detriment of the underwriter, its
counsel and the investing public.1
The SEC has recognized this problem and has suggested that
underwriters and their counsel "may elect to apply somewhat dif-
ferent, but equally thorough, investigatory practices and proce-
dures.""1 For example, a suggestion has been made that under-
writers and their counsel "develop in advance a reservoir of
knowledge" about the issuers whose securities they may be called
upon to underwrite.' This suggestion does not incorporate any
recommendation as to who should bear the cost of this ongoing
investigation where there is no assurance that an offering would be
consummated or, in fact, a particular underwriter would be named.
Present intent to offer is not the same as a commitment to offer
and while an issuer may elect to list a group of potential under-
108. These participants were cognizant of their obligations under the federal securities
laws. See Greene, supra note 102, at 781. See also 46 Fed. Reg. 42,017 (1981).
109. See supra notes 103, 106 and accompanying text.
110. See Greene, supra note 104, at 761.
111. See Securities Act Release No. 6335 (Aug. 6, 1981), 46 Fed. Reg. 42,015 (1981).
"Significant public benefits flow from the effective performance of the securities lawyer's
role. The exercise of independent, careful and informed legal judgment on difficult issues is
critical to the flow of material information to the securities markets." In re Carter, supra
note 8, at 84,167.
112. 46 Fed. Reg. 42,020 (1981).
113. Id.
RULE 415
writers, it does not have to choose from that list in the final analy-
sis. In fact, an issuer could market securities without an under-
writer"' directly to large institutional investors." Such a scenario
not only reverses roles, it eliminates half the due diligence process.
THE DILEMMA
The SEC's new integrated disclosure system, of which Rule 415
is a part, will frequently require reliance on information contained
in periodic disclosure documents which the underwriter's counsel
had no hand in preparing." 6 The suggestion that underwriters and
possibly their counsel attend periodic investor relations programs
of the issuer" 7 is not responsive to this problem, due to the super-
ficial nature of material generally disclosed at these programs.
The SEC's suggestion that underwriters and their counsel ana-
lyze "periodic reports filed pursuant to the Exchange Act,"11 8 puts
them in an unclear position since they do not usually prepare the
issuer's annual report and periodic financial statements. 119 The
SEC has suggested that underwriters and their counsel involve
themselves in the preparation of these documents on a regular and
continuing basis.120 This proposal could create drafting sessions
comprised of several competing underwriters and their counsel to-
gether with corporate officers and their counsel all attempting to
comply with the SEC's due diligence requirements. It might be dif-
ficult under these conditions for issuers to cooperate with under-
writers and their counsel "in their efforts to satisfy their statutory
obligations."'' This expensive process could tempt those involved
to take due diligence shortcuts, thereby diminishing the quality of
disclosure.12 2 If counsel for an underwriter is asked to participate
and assist in the preparation of documents for a given shelf regis-
tration, he might be reluctant, fearful of a Rule 2(e) proceeding, to
get involved or to permit his client to get involved unless the issuer
114. See supra notes 103, 106 and accompanying text.
115. On September 20, 1982, Exxon Corp., utilizing a shelf registration, announced the
planned public auction of $135,000,000 worth of 11% five-year notes, offered through its
Netherland Antilles finance subsidiary, thereby bypassing underwriters and their counsel.
Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1982, at 44, col. 2.
116. 46 Fed. Reg. 42,017 (1981).
117. Id. at 42,021.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 42,020.
120. Id. at 42,021.
121. Id.
122. See Id. at 42,017; Pitt & Williams, supra note 87, at 23, col. 1.
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were one in which counsel and his underwriter client had amassed
a "reservoir of knowledge"128 and, in fact, had substantial and cur-
rent dealings with the company. 12 '
When an issuer decides to offer its securities, underwriter's
counsel may receive fleeting notice of the pending sale. Overnight
preoccupation with price amendments and distribution plans
should eliminate all but the most cursory due diligence. The un-
derwriter will be reluctant to announce his readiness to the issuer
until his counsel indicates his willingness to proceed."2 Aggressive
underwriters, taking counsel's malpractice concerns as self-moti-
vated, might seek other counsel. Thus, it has been observed: "Law-
yers who are seen by their clients as being motivated by fears for
their personal liability will not be consulted on difficult issues."126
The SEC has acknowledged this dilemma. Issuers sensing reluc-
tance might seek other underwriters "willing to do less.' 27 This
appearance of vacillation could cause the issuer to place the securi-
ties directly without an underwriter," 8 thereby eliminating one
half of the entire due diligence process. Issuer's counsel will be
forced to accept added burdens and responsibilities, recognizing
that they may not have the benefit of underwriters' counsel in a
given offering. Accounting firms, already subject to the full mea-
sure of 2(e) proceedings,' 2 ' will recognize this lack of dual due dili-
gence and, therefore, request substantial last minute surveillance
and review in their own right. Whatever due diligence procedures
develop, they will be costly and require extensive ongoing
surveillance. 30
123. 46 Fed. Reg. 42,020 (1981).
124. Id. The SEC has recognized the important and delicate role of the securities attor-
ney in the public offering process: "In the course of rendering securities law advice, the
lawyer is called upon to make difficult judgments, often under great pressure and in areas
where the legal signposts are far apart and only faintly discernible." In re Carter, supra note
8, at 84,167.
125. 46 Fed. Reg. 42,017 (1981).
126. In re Carter, supra note 8, at 84,167.
"Concern about his own liability may alter the balance of his judgment in one direction as
surely as an unseemly obeisance to the wishes of his client can do so in the other. Id.
127. 46 Fed. Reg. 42,017 (1981).
128. See supra note 115.
129. See generally Downing & Miller, supra note 18 for a clear statement of 2(e)'s appli-
cability to the accounting profession.
130. See 46 Fed. Reg. 42,020-21 (1981).
RULE 415
EFFECTS ON THE INVESTING PUBLIC
During the last several years, considerable concentration has oc-
curred within the underwriting industry:
1970 1981 Increase
Domestic Underwritten
Public Financing $30.5 billion $57.8 billion 89.1%
Number of Issues 1373 1429 4.1
Average Size of Issue 22.2 million 40.4 million 81.7
Number of Managing
Underwriters 410 293 (28.5)
Underwritings Managed
by Ten Largest Firms 20.7 billion 47.3 billion 128.4
Market Share 67% 82% 22.4
Source: Corporate Financing Directory, Inv. Dealers Dig. (Mar. 23, 1971); Corporate Financ-
ing Directory, Inv. Dealers Dig. (Mar. 6, 1982).*
Even prior to promulgation of Rule 415, Rule 2(e) concerns led
securities attorneys to gravitate to seasoned issuers and established
underwriters, accentuating the trend commenced by economic and
market factors. One commentator has remarked:
Experienced securities lawyers are being forced to weigh their
personal security against the limited benefits of representing
small but risky accounts. In many cases, the potential liabilities
exceed the benefits. The small company usually has the greatest
need of experienced legal counsel, yet these clients are the ones
who are most likely to be deprived of experienced counsel as a
consequence of the SEC position. 131
Differences in due diligence techniques effectively mandated by
Rule 415 will increase the attorney's concerns for improper con-
duct allegations and cause him to avoid participation in Rule 415
offerings or to increasingly seek association with only large, high
quality corporate issuers and well-financed underwriters.
An issuer's desire to move swiftly, combined with its ability to
*SEC compilations vary for this data, principally because SEC data covers all new issues
offered for cash, whereas the information presented here focuses mainly on activity in the
underwriting field. The SEC data also includes offerings that are not underwritten.
131. Lipman, supra note 18, at 470 (footnote omitted). This concentration has also ham-
pered the efforts of small and growing companies to raise capital. Id.
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select managing underwriters at will and on short notice, " 2 may
further limit the number of underwriters available for these financ-
ings. 133 Also, the issuer will tend to deal only with those underwrit-
ers willing to make large purchases on short notice.1 34 This process
should bring business to firms with established distribution net-
works and take business away from underwriters who rely on syn-
dication for marketing and distribution.1 3 5 Only large corporate is-
suers of the highest quality'" have sufficient in-house staff to
develop information and provide it on a continuing basis to sup-
port the due diligence effort which will be required under Rule
415. Only the most sophisticated and well-financed underwriters" 7
can support the research effort necessary to comply with the re-
quirement of the rule and commit the capital necessary to
purchase large blocks of securities on short notice. 38 Other corpo-
rate issuers and underwriters will be effectively precluded from
utilization of Rule 415 and, therefore, a large segment of the capi-
tal markets.3 9
The investing public is not benefited by this concentration of
financial power. Dissemination of financial information, essential
to the formation of an intelligent investment decision is, at best,
provided on short notice when an issuer decides to effectuate an
offer registered under Rule 415. The swiftness with which transac-
132. See 47 Fed. Reg. 11,396 (1982).
133. SEC decision to extend Rule 415 to December 31, 1983, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,803 (1982)
(Thomas, C., dissenting).
134. Id. at 39,805.
135. See e.g., Morgan Stanley & Co. Comment Letter, Feb. 2, 1982; N.Y. Stock Ex-
change Comment Letter, Feb. 11, 1982 (file ref. no. S7-896).
136. There are probably less than 200 large, high quality corporate issuers in the United
States. Their common attributes, in addition to maintaining a sizeable in-house staff capa-
ble of providing continuing information for Rule 415 due diligence efforts, include a capabil-
ity of readily filing voluminous documents for incorporation by reference, widespread mar-
ket recognition and at least an "A" rating on their senior securities.
137. Underwriters fitting this description, of which there are probably less than 20 in the
United States, will generally: (1) have capital sufficient to purchase a large percentage of
any shelf-registered issue; (2) have an ability to absorb serious short-term trading losses
against regular trading activities; (3) be well-connected to large institutional purchasers; (4)
have a highly centralized marketing organization capable of acting swiftly with sizeable
volumes of securities; (5) have an extensive internal research staff capable of following major
companies closely on an ongoing basis; and (6) not rely on syndication for underwriting and
marketing of securities.
138. 47 Fed. Reg. 39,805 (1980) (Thomas, C., dissenting). "[O]nly the largest players...
will inevitably come to be the exclusive underwriters and selling dealers for major new is-
sues." Id.
139. Id. Commissioner Thomas has also pointed to probable adverse effects on regional
securities firms and on capital formation generally.
RULE 415
tions of this nature can be completed all but preclude the "average
investor" from receiving information about the proposed offering,
let alone receiving the material in time to make an informed deci-
sion. Underwriters, under pressure to dispose of large quantities of
securities purchased on short notice under Rule 415 will naturally
seek only large institutional investors capable of purchasing large
blocks of securities with whom they have a well established rela-
tionship. Institutional investors, closely attuned to the marketplace
for new issues, can preclude public participation (except later at
higher prices) reducing the ultimate liquidity of national exchanges
for public securities. Institutional investors will, in effect, have first
choice among prime securities of prime issuers. 40
COMMENTARY
Members of the industry largely ignored the proposed rule dur-
ing most of the comment period,1 41 but it became subject to in-
tense criticism in the weeks prior to its adoption."43 Morgan Stan-
ley & Co. and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. urged
the SEC to delay action on the rule, charging that it would under-
mine the current method of issuing securities through underwrit-
ers' syndications and would allow a few well-financed firms to cap-
ture large blocks of new issues." '4 The SEC refused to delay action
on the shelf rule.1 44 The Securities Industry Association (SIA) ar-
gued that the process is too speedy to give investors enough time
to get adequate information and make decisions. 45
On September 1, 1982, the SEC extended the life of the shelf
rule at least until December 31, 1983.146 When announced, Salo-
mon Brothers pointed out that the decision will continue a trend
which gives the largest firms a distinct advantage.1 47 Since the rule
was adopted, seventy-three issues totalling $15.7 billion, or an av-
erage of $215 million per issue, have been registered pursuant to
140. See 47 Fed. Reg. 39,806-07 (1982) (Thomas, C., dissenting).
141. 14 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 532 (1982).
142. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,701-02 (1982).
143. 14 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 532 (1982).
144. 47 Fed. Reg. 39,799 (1982).
145. Wall St. J., June 8, 1982, at 56, col. 2. The SIA proposed a five-day "cooling off
period" from the time of filing to time of sale. If 30 days elapse without a sale, a new five-
day waiting period should be required. Id.
146. 47 Fed. Reg. 39,799 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.415).
147. Noble, S.E.C., 2 to 1, Backs Shelf Registrations, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1982, at 32,
col.6.
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the expanded sections of the shelf rule." " One underwriter esti-
mates that twenty percent of funds raised in the United States
since March, 1982 have been through the use of shelf
registrations. " 9
RECOMMENDATIONS
The objectives enumerated by the SEC in promulgating Rule
415150 could be achieved under the new integrated disclosure sys-
tem with broader reliance on simplified registration procedures,
particularly those which do not involve indiscriminate whims with
respect to underwriter selection. In addition, timely review at the
SEC staff level would facilitate the market flexibility large issuers
seek. This would not force reversal of the traditional roles of un-
derwriters' and issuers' counsel and would still provide the issuer
with flexibility in financing corporate requirements. The risk of im-
proper conduct allegations would remain in perspective with all of
the other risks attendant to the securities business rather than be-
coming counsel's primary concern. 151 Instead of Rule 2(e) operating
with Rule 415 to accentuate undesirable market concentration and
operating to the detriment of the investing public, Rule 2(e) would
remain as a standard for improper conduct. Other competitive fac-
tors would be free to work at the forces of market concentration.
CONCLUSION
The SEC's experimental adoption of Rule 415 has occurred at a
time when the securities bar is at long last receiving direction from
the ABA, the Final Draft and the SEC which, taken as a whole,
appear to provide objective standards of professional responsibil-
ity. Rule 415 creates another dilemma for the securities attorney
with questionable side effects. The objectives sought by the SEC
through the rule could be achieved without reactivating the contro-
versy which has surrounded improper conduct standards and the
unique problems of professional responsibility in securities
practice.
148. Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1982, at 26, Col. 1-2. The average size of these issues is five
times the average size of issues publicly underwritten last. See table infra.
149. Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1982, at 44 Col. 3-4.
150. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
151. "[To] permit a lawyer to avoid or reduce his liability simply by avoiding participa-
tion in the drafting process, may well have the undesirable effect of reducing the quality of
the disclosure by the many to protect against the defalcations of the few." In re Carter
Supra note 8, at 84167.
